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Abstract  
This  paper  develops  a  general  equilibrium  framework  to  study  the  role  of preferences 
structure (additive, multiplicative and convex combination of both) in connecting  
consumption, health  investment, stock of health  and capital, and their  eﬀects  on the wage 
rate  and on productivity. We show that the elasticities of health production, health 
investment and health cost determine jointly how health influences the wage rate.   We 
examine the steady state and the equilibrium dynamics of the model.  In the case  of 
additive preferences,  the existence  of equilibrium  and  the stability of the dynamic  system 
require  that  the ratio  of the elasticities of the cost  of health  and health  investment is 
greater  than  the elasticity of the production  function  of health.  Health stock can have 
either positive or negative eﬀects on wage rate.  The reverse holds for multiplicative 
preferences and the eﬀect of health stock on wage rate is always positive.   Longevity is a 
decreasing convex-concave function of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution of health.  
We also compare the relative behavior of opportunity costs of health under preferences 
structure. 
Key words: Consumption, health investment, preferences structure, wage rates, longevity, 
opportunity costs 
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1 Introduction
There is a widely established consensus on the causal relation between health and longevity
in the sense that better health conditions extend longevity. Some studies were even interested
in the challenges of studying the conditions of a long healthy life, for a long life will often
go hand in hand with a decline in health (Kirkwood, 2008). This consensus crumbles when
it comes to link or correlate health and productivity, or health and economic growth. This
relationship has been the subject of heated debate since the publication of the study by Acemoglu
and Johnson (2007) where the authors have casted serious doubts about the fact that better
health would lead more growth per capita. Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) have underlined that
empirical studies that showed a sizable positive eect of health on individual productivity have
not resolved the question of whether health dierences are the cause of observed large dierences
in income since these studies do not incorporate general equilibrium eects. The most important
general equilibrium eect comes from diminishing returns of work per eective unit. This is for
example the case when physical capital is supplied inelastically. Indeed, in the presence of
diminishing returns, estimations based on micro data overestimate the benets of aggregated
productivity due to improved health, especially when improving health comes with increased
population. Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) showed that the increase in life expectancy associated
with increase in population may have a negative eect on income per capita for the working age
population. This result is conrmed in particular for countries that have experienced high life
expectancy, leading to a kind of puzzle.
Following the study of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), other authors such as Ashraf et al.
(2008) raised the same question.1 These authors used a simulation based model that incorporates
both micro and macro components, and which takes into account the direct eect of health on
worker productivity. Contrary to the popular belief, they found a very moderate eect of
improving health on income per capita. Ashraf et al. (2008) concluded that the rationale for
health policies should then rely on humanitarian reasons rather than economic ones. The specic
econometric questions underlying the debate are very well explained in Strittmater and Sunde
(2013).2
This paper develops a theoretical framework to contribute to the debate by elaborating in
depth on the structure of preferences. How would improving health status aect consumption,
wage income and productivity? Depending on the answer, the impact on growth would be
sizeable or small. This study aims at providing a theoretical answer to this question by showing
that the adopted preferences do matter. To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature
has not yet investigated the role of preferences in this regard.
Indeed, from the AIDS empirical literature (e.g., Bloom and Mahal, 1997a, 1997b and Cud-
dington and Hancock, 1994), we know that consumption and health are interconnected but we
cannot make conclusions about the net eects of health investment.3 Indeed, it seems ana-
lytically dicult to slice on the net eect of a high health deterioration rate and low health
productivity on health investment as not all diseases have the same eects. From a theoretical
perspective, in the Grossman's (1972) standard model, health is considered as capital stock
that increases with investment. Agents' preferences are separable in health and ordinary con-
sumption. As a result, the returns from these two goods are independent. However, evidences
stressed the fact that ordinary consumption is also crucial for health. Moreover, one of the
1See also Weil (2007, 2014).
2See Acemoglu and Johnson (2014) and Bloom et al. (2014) to follow up debate.
3See also Corrigan et al. (2005) and McDonald and Roberts (2006).
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main economic implications of health shock is a probable and signicant distortion in savings
behavior. Chakraborty (2004) considered the problem of public investment in health within the
framework of overlapping generation models. The author showed that in poor countries where
life expectancy is weak, individuals are more likely to discount the future and thus less are
inclined to save. Cuddington and Hancock (1994) also stated that: health expenditure induces
a decrease in savings at the expense of capital accumulation. However, this is questionable due
to the fact that health expenditure is harmful to consumption. Therefore, there is an overriding
issue as to how to deal with savings in the context of health depreciation.
Our study contributes to the literature in several aspects. Firstly, we adopt a more general
set-up by considering both separable and non-separable preferences (additive, multiplicative
and a convex combination of both) in consumption and health, meaning in the latter case
consumption is also crucial for health. Second, we investigate the eects of health status on
the subsequent life cycle, in particular on productivity, wage income and consumption in a
general equilibrium setting. In order to have a better picture of the life cycle aspect of the issue,
we also include a nal good sector where productivity depends on the health stock. Thirdly,
we characterize the analytical solutions of the optimization problem to study the equilibrium
dynamics. We shall nd that the picture is quite sophisticated, depending on the assumed
preferences. For simplication, we consider in a rst step lifetime of individuals as innite.
However, this facet of our approach is closely related to the framework of Grossman (1972) and
Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) that health capital is still a determinant of lifetime utility. Relying
on this setting, we connect three factors: health production, health investment and health
costs. We have shown that the elasticities of these three variables determine jointly how health
aects labor and hence productivity. The framework allows to relate the evolution of wage rate
with respect to health status, the transmission channel between wage rate and health being
labor productivity. It also enables us to study longevity as well the opportunity cost of health
investment.
When the preferences are additively separable, the existence of equilibrium and the stability
of the dynamic system require the ratio of the elasticities of the cost of health and health
investment is greater than the elasticity of the production function of health. The stock of
health can have either positive or negative eects on the wage rate. The latter nding provides a
theoretical basis to the empirical debate raised by Acemoglu and Jonhson (2007). The economic
intuition behind this is that a high stock of health may have a negative eect on the wage
rate if economic growth (and hence the distribution of income) declines because of the aging
population for example, or because of high opportunity cost in health spending, which harm
economic sectors. This is also possible if the improved health leads to a reduction of capital per
capita, and thus lower levels of income per capita. When the preferences are multiplicative, the
condition reverses in the fact that the ratio of the elasticities of the cost of health and health
investment should be lower than the elasticity of the production function of health. Moreover,
the eect of health stock on wage rate is always positive. In the case of convex combination
of additive and multiplicative preferences, we nd that the equilibrium dynamic of the stock
of health and investment in health is obtained as a function of time for which we observe an
exponential decay. However, the solution of the dynamic system is not analytically tractable. We
also obtained that the structure of preferences determines the shape and existence of longevity
with respect to the elasticity of substitution of health. Lastly, we establish the conditions for
comparing the opportunity cost of health under preference structures.
In this paper, we abstract away from the pure literature on infectious diseases and their
modes of transmission (see e.g, Boucekkine and Laargue, 2010, Goenka and Liu, 2012, Goenka
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et al., 2014). It would have been interesting to incorporate this issue in our dynamic setting
to assess the impact of health on variables such as capital accumulation, consumption, wages,
etc. Here, we do not make any specic assumptions on the nature of diseases (infectious or
not) as well as on their transmission process. Incorporating these mechanisms in our model will
pose additional extra diculties that we leave for future research while focusing on the equally
dicult issue of preferences structure.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the general framework
including optimality conditions. In Section 3, we study the model with separable additive
preferences meaning that health and consumption enter additively into the utility function.
Section 4 is devoted to the model with a multiplicative non-separable preferences which allows
for an interaction between health and consumption. Section 5 considers a framework with a
convex combination of the additive and the multiplicative preferences. The penultimate section
6 studies the opportunity costs of investment in health and derives some policy implications.
The last section concludes the study. Proofs of propositions and further supplement materials
are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Motivational framework
This section introduces a set of generalities of the framework that will be used subsequently.
This includes functional hypotheses and optimality conditions that are required for equilibrium
solutions as well separability issues regarding the preferences. The model is based on innitely-
lived consumers where agent's welfare is composed of utility derived from consumption goods
and health.
2.1 Setting up and assumptions
We assume that the followings:
Assumption 1 The instantaneous utility function at time z, U(C(z)) : R+ ! R+ is C1 with
UC > 0, U
0
C < 0 and limC(z)!0 UC = 1, where C(z) denotes consumption at time z and
subscript means derivative with respect to concern argument and hereafter.
Assumption 2 The healthy time function (or amount of healthy time) '(M(z)) : R+ ! R+ is
C1 with 'M > 0, '0M < 0, limM(z)!0 'M < 1 and limM(z)!1 'M = 0; where M(z) denotes
the stock of health capital.
Assumption 3 The health production function  (m(z)) : R+ ! R+ is C1 with  m > 0,
 0m < 0, limm(z)!0  m <1 and limm(z)!1  m = 0; where m(z) denotes the health investment.
Assumption 4 The production function F (K(z); L(z)) : R2+ ! R+ is C1. Moreover,
i) F1 > 0, F11 < 0, F2 > 0, F22 < 0, F12 = F21 > 0 and F11F22 F12F21 > 0 where the place
of the subscripts f1; 2g refer to the derivatives of the function with respect to the rst and
second arguments, namely K and L.
ii) limK(z)!0 F1 =1 and limK(z)!1 F1 = 0
iii) F (0; L(z)) = F (K(z); 0) = 0.
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Assumptions 1-4 are optimality conditions. They guarantee convexities of the optimization
problem. The specic functional forms that will be used subsequently fulll these hypothesis.
Consistent with Ehrlich and Chuma (1990), we consider that the stock of health capital can
be maintained or increased through purposive investments m(z). However, health is submitted
to a natural biological deterioration at the rate M . Thus, in contrary to Ehrlich and Chuma
(1990), we assume a constant rate of health depreciation. However, the greater the health that
one intends to maintain in later years, the earlier one must initiate signicant investments in
counteracting the depreciation of health. Let denote  the time preference or discount rate.
Individuals maximize lifetime utility, subject to the state variables. The general framework is
stated as:
max
Z 1
0
V fS[U(C(z)); '(M(z))]; N [U(C(z)); '(M(z))]ge z dz (1)
subject to the law of motion of non-human assets and health:
_A(z) = r(z)A(z) + w(z)'(M(z))  C(z)  h(m(z)) (2)
_M(z) =  (m(z))  MM(z) (3)
where r(z) and w(z) are the interest and wage rate rate respectively, h(m(z)) denotes the cost
of investment in health. The functions S[U(C(z)); '(M(z))] and N [U(C(z)); '(M(z))] denotes
the additive and non additive components of the felicity V (S;N) respectively. Subsequently,
three dierent versions of V (S;N): namely separable, multiplicative and a convex combination
of both be will be studied in which the utility function U(C(z)) and health function '(M(z)) will
be taken as the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) representation. We will also consider
in Appendix (C) examples of alternative preferences for U(C(z)) and '(M(z)): namely the
logarithmic and the quadratic.
From the production side, we consider a representative rm with Cobb-Douglas technology
for the function F with the renement that productivity depends on health deep parameters.
Moreover, we assume productivity in this sector as a function of the health stock.4 This leads
to Y (z) = B (M(z))F (K;L) where, Y (z), K (z) and L (z) are respectively the output, capital
and labor, while B(M(z)) is the productivity as a function of the health stock M . Let the
eective labor supply be N (z) = (M)L(z). The fraction (M) shall depend on the level of
health, L(z) being the total labor input and (M) is an increasing function. As productivity
depends on the stock of health, B(M(z)) = a(z)(M)1  with 0 <  < 1 and a(z) represents the
technical progress which corresponds also to the global productivity. For the limit conditions of
B(M), the minimum level of health is assumed M = Mmin  0. Furthermore, B(Mmin) = a(z)
if one assumes that (Mmin) = 1. We also assume that B(1) = Mmax (which implies that the
productivity cannot increase indenitely) and BMM  0. Let us denote k^ = KL the capital-labor
ratio. Then the output per labor is given by f(k^) = Y (z)L(z) = B(M(z))k^(z)
.
2.2 Optimality
Individuals maximize lifetime utility as stated in Eq. (1), subject to the state variables _A(z)
and _M(z) in Eqs. (2) and (3) respectively. The Hamiltonian of this optimal control problem is
4We thank two anonymous referees of the Journal for suggesting to make the productivity in the nal sector
as a function of the health stock and their suggestion to study the eect health not only on felicity but also on
labor supply and wage income.
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given by:
H(C;m;M;A; A; M ) = V

S [U(C(z)); '(M(z))] ; N [U(C(z)); '(M(z))]
	
e z
+ A

r(z)A(z) + w(z)'(M(z))  C(z)  h(m(z))e z (4)
+ M

 (m(z))  MM(z)

e z
The optimality conditions (where, to ease notations, the argument z is removed when it's not
necessary) associated to this problem are given as:
@H
@C(z)
= e z ( A + UCVNNU + UCSUVS) = 0 (5a)
@H
@m(z)
=  e zAhm + e zM m = 0 (5b)
@H
@M(z)
= e z
   MM + 'M (wM +N'VN + S'VS) = e z M   _M (5c)
@H
@A(z)
= e z(rA) = e z

A   _A

(5d)
with the associated transversality conditions:
lim
z!1A(z)e
 zA(z) = 0 (6a)
lim
z!1M (z)e
 zM(z) = 0 (6b)
The functions A(z) and M (z) are the costates and subscripts indicate the rst derivative of
functions w.r.t mentioned arguments. The general dynamic system is given by:
_C(z)
C(z)
=  (r   )(VNNU + SUVS) 	1
_M(z)'M
	2
UC
C(z)
(7a)
_m(z)
m(z)
=   
UC(VNN' + SUVS)( mh
0
m   hm 0m)
 m
m(z)
(7b)
_M(z)
M(z)
=
 (m(z))
M
  M (7c)
_k
k
= B(M)k^ 1   C^
k
  m^
k
   (7d)
where   0 is the capital depreciation rate and w is the wage rate and:
	1 = VSSU' + VNNU' +N'(V''NU + SUVSN ) + S'(N'VSN + SUVSS)
	2 = U
0
C(VNNU + SUVS) + U
2
C(V''N
2
U + 2SUNUVSN + VSSUU + VNNUU + S
2
UVSS)
 = UC(VNN' + SUVS) [w'M m   (M + r)hm] + 'M m(N'VN + S'VS)
Our objective consists in nding the optimal trajectories of the model key variables: consump-
tion, investment in health, health stock and capital. Given the assumptions 1-4, our optimization
program allows to get these optimal variables. It is worth noticing that it would have been inter-
esting to incorporate infectious diseases and their modes of transmission in our dynamic setting
to assess the impact of health on variables such as capital accumulation, consumption, wages,
etc. Indeed, it is interesting to know how health deterioration may aect the existence of solu-
tions to the maximization of welfare. As well documented in Goenka and Liu (2012) and Goenka
et al. (2014), if this damage was done by infectious diseases, then a problem of non-convexity
arises and one needs to check existence conditions for optimal solutions.5
5We are very much grateful to a referee who pointed out to clarify the potential non-convexity issues in the
study. Indeed, Goenka and Liu (2012) and Goenka et al. (2014) showed that given the internal propagation mech-
anism of infectious diseases, there are non-convexities in the transmission process which make the optimization
problem subtle.
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In fact, Goenka and Liu (2012) and Goenka et al. (2014) discussed the optimal investment
in health, in the light of the interaction between the transmission of diseases and the economy.
If diseases aect the labor market, health investments choices also aect the transmission of
diseases. Health expenditures lead to the accumulation of health capital and thus reduce the
spread of diseases and improve convalescence and recovery from illness. However, the non-
convexity of the dynamics of infection implies that one should be careful in implementing the
optimal control techniques. Indeed, to characterize optimal solutions, the rst order conditions
(and the transversality conditions) of the Hamiltonian may be necessary but not sucient. Then
there may be jumps issues of state and co-state variables within the feasible set whereas the
existence of optimal solutions relies on compactness of the set and absolute continuity of the
state variables. In this study we do not make specic assumptions on the nature of diseases
(infectious or not) as well as their transmission mechanism. Incorporating these mechanisms in
our model will pose additional extra diculties that we leave for future research while focussing
on the equally dicult separability issue of preferences structure.
Some general remarks can be made before addressing the calculation of optimal trajectories.
Firstly, Eq.(5a) gives the expected evolution of optimal consumption which can be disentangle
into _C(z) = C1(z) + C2(z), with C1(z) =
 (r )(VNNU+SUVS)UC
	2
and C2(z) =
	1UC _M(z)'M
	2
. The
term C1(z) denotes the Fisher conditions binding the slope of consumption trajectory to the
dierence between the time preference and interest rates. The term C2(z) reects the interaction
between the stock of health and consumption. When time increases, the stock of health shall
move towards its minimum level, and the marginal loss of time health 'M (M(z)) will reach its
maximum, thereby reducing consumption.
Secondly, the opportunity cost of health stock (or unit cost), can be retrieved from the
Eq.(5b) as MA = g(z). At equilibrium, the instantaneous user cost of health stock is equal to
the instantaneous marginal benet from one-unit increase in the stock of health. The optimal
health investment is determined by the intersection between the curves representing these two
elements. We have not chosen an explicit specication for the cost function, but we can still
derive some information from the expression of the opportunity cost of health, based on co-state
variables. Thus, it can be shown from Eq.(5c) that :
g(M(z))

M + r   _g(z)
g(z)

= 'M

w +
1
A(0)
(N'VN + S'VS) e
( r)z

(8)
The rst part of this equality stands for the user cost of health capital, the form of which as can
be seen is comparable to that of physical capital in the theory of investment. It is also termed
`marginal eciency of capita' (Grossman, 1972). The second member is the eect on the utility
of an increase in the stock of health. Thus, the user cost of health capital should be equal to the
instantaneous marginal benet of an increase in the stock of health. The relations (Eq.8) can
be transformed into a dierential equation g(t) which shows after solving that the opportunity
cost is therefore proportional to:
g(M(z)) =
Z 1
z

'M (M(x))

w +
1
A(0)
(N'VN + S'VS) e
( r)x

e (M+r)(x z)dx (9)
This expression gives the present value of the benets of health stock available on the remaining
life. We will use the cost opportunity term later on in the penultimate section for policy purposes.
In the next section, we address the case where the expression of V is specied to have a separable
term. We shall study the steady state and equilibrium dynamics of the model.
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3 Additively separable preferences
The interaction between health and the ways it aects felicity has been so far investigated within
additive structure preferences (Hall and Jones, 2007). As a result health status and consumption
are additively separable functions implying that the marginal utility of consumption is indepen-
dent from health status. While adopting this approach in this section, let's remember that we
add a nal good sector to better understand the life cycle aspect agent's behavior. In that case,
the welfare function V turns to take the form:
V

S[U(C(z)); '(M(z))]; N [U(C(z)); '(M(z))]
	
= S[U(C(z)); '(M(z))] = U(C(z))+'(M(z))
(10)
We shall also resort to the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) felicity function, which has the
below functional forms for U(C(z)) and '(M(z)), and a decreasing return in health investment
for function  (m(z)):
U(C(z)) =
C(z)1 1
1  1 and '(M(z)) =
M(z)1 2
1  2 (11)
h(m(z)) = m(z) and  (m(z)) = bm (12)
with 1 < 1, 2 < 1, b > 0,  > 0,  > 0 and 0 <  < 1. Here 1 is the inverse of
elasticity of substitution between consumption at any two points in time, and 2 denotes the
same for health capital. U(C(z)) and '(M(z)) are strictly increasing and concave respectively
in C(z) and M(z).  (m(z)) represents the health investments function, which is concave in
m(z), reecting the assumed diminishing returns in health investment.  is the productivity
or eciency of health investment. Increased health care productivity not only shifts the health
production function upward, but causes each unit of health care to have a larger contribution
to health as well. Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) also assumed that consumers choose death when
the stock of capital M(z) is under a certain minimal level Mmin. All these functions fullled the
assumptions 1-3.
3.1 Steady state
The rst order conditions with respect to C(z) and A(z) from the Hamiltonian (4) yield the
traditional Euler equations. One can see that equations (7a) and (7b) turn to be respectively:
_C(z)
C(z)
= 0() (r   )SUVS   [VSSU' + S'SUVSS ] _M(z)'M = 0 (13)
and
_m(z)
m(z)
= 0() UCSU [w'M m   (M + r)hm] + 'M mS' = 0 (14)
Thus, Eq.(13) denes a dierential equation in M(t) which allows to nd the value M(t) at
equilibrium. The latter can then be introduced into (14) to nd consumption equilibrium C(t)
given that the stock of health and investment are linked by the relation (7c). More specically,
using Eqs.(11) and (12) we obtain the demand side system:
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_C
C
=
r   
1
(15a)
_m
m
=
   'M 2m + UC (r   )hm m + ((M + )hm   w'M m m
UCm( mh0m   hm) 0m
(15b)
_M
M
=
bm
M
  M (15c)
Proceeding with the nal sector, remember that f(k^) = Y (z)L(z) = B(M(z))k^(z)
. Then, the
maximization of the prot function under perfect competition allows to equalize the marginal
cost of each factor with its marginal benet. Therefore,
r(z) = B(M(z))k^(z) 1    (16)
w(z) = f(k^(z))  k^(z)f 0(k^(z)) = (1  )B(M(z))k^(z) (17)
Combining the demand and the supply sides, we can now characterize the equilibrium of the
economy. We can write
_^
k(z) = B(M(z))k^(z)   C^(z)  m^(z)  ( + n) k^(z) (18)
where C^(z) and m^(z) are respectively the consumption and health expenditure per labor, and
n is the population growth rate. Therefore, the dynamics of the economy can be summarized
by the following non-trivial four dimensional system:
_^
C(z)
C^(z)
=
r(z)  
1
(19a)
_^m(z)
m^(z)
=
M + r
    
b(w + C1)M 2m 
(  ) (19b)
_^
M(z) = bm   MM^(z) (19c)
_^
k(z) = B(M(z))k^(z)   C^(z)  m^(z)  k^(z) (19d)
including k^(0) and M^(0) as given and in addition the transversality conditions. The steady-state
values of C^, m^, M^ , and k^ are obtained by equalizing
_^
C, _^m,
_^
M ,
_^
k to zero. We obtain:
bC = w
1  

1  
r + 

 

M
b
 1
 cM 1 (20a)
bm = M
b
 1
 cM 1 (20b)
cM2 1+ = b

b
M
 2

(M + r)

w +

w
1  

1  
r + 

 

M
b
 1
 cM 11 (20c)
k^ = B(M)
1
1 

 + 

 1
 1
(20d)
The following proposition characterizes the solution of the system.
Proposition 1 There is a unique solution to Eq.(20c).
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Proof. See Appendix A.
The next proposition states the comparative statics of the model as regard the eect of
health stock on the wage rate. It also states the conditions of existence for the equilibrium and
the stability of the dynamic system.
Proposition 2 The eect of health stock on the wage rate is positive provided that   (1 2)
and  > . Moreover, there exists a minimum wage rate w0 from which the stock of health
impacts positively on the wage rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The condition in the proposition means that the ratio of the elasticities of the cost of health
and health investment is greater than the elasticity of the production function of health. In
addition, for the stock of health to have a positive eect on the wage rate, it is necessary that
the wage rate remains higher than a minimum level w0. We seek for conditions under which the
minimum level w0 can be determined. Relying on Eq.(A-1; see Appendix A), setting WN  0
and WD > 0 is equivalent to writing respectively w  f1(M) and w > f2(M) where
f1(M) =
(r + )(1  )
r +    
2664Mb
 1

M
1
 +
0B@

b
M
2 
M
b
  1M  1+ +2 (M + r)(     2)
b1
1CA
1
 1+1
3775
f2(M) =
(r + )(1  )
r +    
"
1
  r   
(  1)(r + )
 1
1 1
+

M
b
 1

M
1

#
Insert Figure 1
Figure 1 shows the curves f1(M) and f2(M). The dash line curve from the origin becomes solid
line from M0, while the solid curve from w0 becomes dash line from M0. We have:
M0 =
264 r+ (1 )(r+)

b
M
 1

+2
(M + r)(   + 2)
b
375

1 + 2
(21)
w0 =
(r + )(1  )
r +    

1
r +    
(1  )(r + )
 1
1 1
(22)
In fact, the inuence of the stock of health on the wage rate is positive in the area bounded
by the y-axis and the solid curve, knowing that the minimum ordinate is w0. This domain is
sup(f1; f2)(M). It is therefore possible that the stock of health has a negative eect on the wage
rate and it is more related to the specication of the welfare function. Indeed, in the case of
additive preferences we nd that SU' and VSS from Eq.(13) vanish. As a result, the solution
M(z) is derived from Eq.(14). Relying on Eq.(7b), the expression of the wage rate is obtained
as:
w(M(z)) =
(M + r)hm[m
(z)]
'M [M(z)] m[m(z)]
  S'[M
(z)]
UC [C(z)]SU [C(z)]
(23)
where the variables m(z) and C(z) are expressed in function of M(z).
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This result calls for some comments. There is a consensus on the positive eects of health
on growth and development. Particularly in developing areas such as in Africa where improving
the quality of health is crucial. Gallup and Sachs (2001) estimated that elimination of malaria
in sub-Saharan Africa would allow the continent to achieve an annual average growth of 2.6%.
However, it is not empirically proven convincingly that health has a positive impact on growth
and development. Indeed, most studies that have examined this impact do not have a general
equilibrium perspective, which prevents them grasping the global dimension of the issue, in-
cluding possible adverse eects of health (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007). Our work helps to ll
two important theoretical gaps in the literature. The rst vacuum is the absence of a compre-
hensive approach, which shows the role of health in a exible theoretical framework, without
introducing morbidity constraints or constraints related to demographic pressures of the popu-
lation. Hence our general equilibrium approach can show that the economic eects of health,
measured through the wage rate (and therefore productivity) may be positive, but only under
certain conditions, especially related to quality of health and costs of health investments.
The second theoretical gap is evidence of negative eects of health on the economic sphere.
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) showed empirically that the eects of health (measured by
longevity) on growth of GDP per capita can be negative. Relying on a neoclassical growth
model, our study provides a theoretical basis to this nding. Intuitively, a high stock of health
may well have a negative eect on the wage rate if economic growth (and hence the distribution
of income) is reduced due to the aging population for example, or because of high opportunity
cost in health spending, which harm economic sectors. This is also possible, if improved health
leads to a reduction of capital per capita, and thus lower levels of income per capita.
3.2 Phase diagrams
Let us now study the equilibrium dynamics of the system with phase diagrams. To this end,
we express the variable in units of physical capital by setting: c = Ck , m =
m
k and M =
M
k . It
follows that the variables follows the system:
_c
c
=
r   
1
  r + (1  )

+ c+m (24a)
_m
m
=
M + r
    
b(w + k1c1) M 2m k  2
(  )  
r + (1  )

+ c+m (24b)
_M
M
=
bmk 1
M
  M   r + (1  )

+ c+m (24c)
The condition in the proposition ensures also the existence and uniqueness of the steady state
and guarantees the stability. Relying on the implicit behavior of m and parameters conditions,
we prove below that this leads to the the existence and uniqueness of the solution. We are now
interested in the changes in the equilibrium, when some health parameters are modied. We
propose a geometrical representation by drawing the phase diagrams associated to the system
(24a)-(24c). The diagrams are plotted on dierent planes while xing each of the variables.
Lemma 1 elaborates on the phase diagrams in Figures 2, 3 and 4.
Lemma 1 We have:
i) For m xed, the curve _c = 0 is a horizontal line and the locus _M = 0 is an increasing and
concave function. Moreover we have lim M!1 c = b2 for b2 given.
ii) For c xed, the curve _M = 0 monotonically increases and the locus _m = 0 is a decreasing
and convex function with lim m!0 M = 0 and lim m!b  M =1.
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iii) For M xed, the curve _c = 0 is a decreasing straight line and the locus _m = 0 is an
increasing function over a real support and it decreases monotonically from m0.
Insert Figures 2, 3, 4
Fixing m = m0 leads to the phase diagram onto the plane (c; M) (see Figure 2). We have
two curves. The rst one ( _c = 0) is independent of the stock of health. An increase of the rate
of health depreciation (M ) implies a shift of the second curve (
_M) towards the left. This curve
is increasing with both consumption and health. The shift induces a decrease of health from the
steady state E0 to a new one E1, where consumption remains constant.
The second phase diagram in Figure 3 is plotted onto the plane ( m; M) by xing c. The two
curves are increasing with the variables m and M), but the stock of health grows faster than
the ow of investment. An increasing rate of health depreciation leads to a high reduction of
the stock of health which is not fully compensated by the investment. So the two curves shift
down to the steady state E1.
Fixing M gives the third diagram in Figure 4 on the plane (c; m). Relying on the equation
( _c = 0) there is a linear relation between the ow of investment and consumption. The stable
manifold is in the zones on the left hand side of E0 above the curve and the right hand side
of E0 below the curve. Within these two zones, the trajectories converge to the steady state
values. An increase of M generates a higher level of investment ows. Moreover, a crowding
eect appears and consumption jumps backward from the rst steady state E0 to the second
one E1.
4 Multiplicative preferences
In the previous section, consumption and health enter into the utility function in an additive
way. As a result, the marginal utility of consumption can be independent from health, which
reects a strong limitation as consumption is also crucial for health. The alternative model in
this section seeks to account for this important aspect. The welfare function V takes now the
form:
V

S[U(C(z)); '(M(z))]; N [U(C(z)); '(M(z))]
	
= N [U(C(z)); '(M(z))] = U(C(z))'(M(z))
(25)
In order to be able to compare consistently the results, we use the same CRRA felicity functional
forms for U(C(z)) and '(M(z)) as in Eq.(11), as well as the same health functions h(m(z)) and
 (m(z)) in Eq.(12). Also the nal sector description is the same. Given this new set-up, we can
study the steady state and equilibrium dynamics of the non-separable multiplicative preferences
model.
4.1 Steady state
Here, Eqs.(7a)-(7b) turn to be respectively
_C(z)
C(z)
= 0() (r   )VNNU   [VNNU' +N'NUV''] _M(z)'M = 0 (26)
and
_m(z)
m(z)
= 0() UC [w'M m   (M + r)hm] + 'M m = 0 (27)
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As previously, Eq.(26) denes a dierential equation inM(t) which allows to nd the valueM(t)
at equilibrium. The latter can then be plugged into (27) to retrieve consumption equilibrium
C(t) thank to relation (7c). The dynamics of the economy is driven at equilibrium by the
following system:
_^
C(z)
C^(z)
=
(r   )M(z) +  MM(z)  bm(z) (2   1)
M(z)1
_^m(z)
m^(z)
=
1
(  )(1 + 1)M(z)1+2)

(M + r)M(z)
1+2(1 + 1)
  bm(z) (wM(z)(1 + 1) + C(z)M(z)2)(1 + 2)

_^
M(z) =  M + bm

m(z)
_^
kz = B(M(z))k^(z)
   C^(z)  m^(z)  k^(z)
(28)
with k^(0) and M^(0) given, plus the transversality conditions. The steady-state values of C^, m^,
M^ , and k^ are obtained by equalizing
_^
C, _^m,
_^
M ,
_^
k to zero. We have:
bC = w
1  

1  
r + 

 

M
b
 1
 cM 1 (29a)
bm = M
b
 1
 cM 1 (29b)
cM2+ 1 = b
(M + r)

M
b
  

"
w +

w(2(r + )  )
(r + )(1  )  

MM
b
 1

cM2 12   1
1   1
#
(29c)
k^ = B(M)
1
1 

 + 

 1
 1
(29d)
The following results hold:
Proposition 3
i) The dynamic system (29a)-(29d) admits a stable solution.
ii) The eect of health stock on wage rate is positive provided that (1  2)   < .
Proof. See Appendix A.
To study how the wage rate behaves in this case, on can rely on Eq.(29c). Solving the latter
with respect to wage leads to:
w(M) =

M
b


M 1+2(M + r)
0@M  + M Mb    MMb  1 ( 1+2)(M+r)( 1+1)
1A
M

1 + M
 1+2 (2r+2 )( 1+2)
(r+)(1 )( 1+1)
 (30)
which is fully expressed in terms of M . On can check (see Appendix A, Proof of Proposition 3)
that w(M) here is an increasing function of M .
As we can see from Propositions 2 and 3, the conditions for the wage rate be related to health
stock are dierent. Both cases share a common condition which is   (1   2). However,
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whereas in the additive case one needs in addition  > , the multiplicative preference requires
 <  leading to the inequality condition in Proposition 3. The latter states that the ratio of
the elasticities of the cost of health and health investment must be lower than the elasticity of
the production function of health. The stock of health has throughout a positive eect on the
wage rate. Compared to the additive preference, we no longer have the domain of negative eect
of stock of health on the wage rate which was displayed in Figure 1. Formally, this result clearly
follows from the structure of preferences. However, from an economic and empirical perspective,
how could one explain this change in wage rate with respect to preferences.
In the case of additive preferences, health status and consumption are additively separable in
the utility function implying that the marginal utility of consumption is independent from health
status. This does not t in for instance with the notion that good nutrition is also important
for health. Indeed, healthy eating might lead to a reduction in mortality from chronic illness,
and appropriate dietary advice can prevent physical and mental deterioration and improve the
quality of life. Evidence from Friis and Michaelsen (1998) supports this rationale. Therefore,
consumption is also crucial for health. The multiplicative non-separable preferences highlights
the interaction between consumption and health although it is very dicult to slice on the net
eect of a high health deterioration rate and low health productivity on health investment.
Another way to interpret the common relationship   (1  2) between the Propositions
2 and 3 is to consider the changes in inter-temporal substitution of health with respect to
health investment and the cost of that investment. Indeed it appears that the higher the health
investment (i.e. ), the lower the elasticity of substitution. Inter-temporal substitutability of
health can become zero if the cost of investment in health become increasingly high. In order to
improve substitutability of health stock over time, justifying a reduction in inertia of household
health behavior, there must be a combination of two phenomena: a gradual decrease in elasticity
of health production and a simultaneous increase of the costs of health investment. This may
seem against intuition. However, it should be noted that if households determine the level of
current health stock taking into account its level in the previous period, this may aect the
future marginal utility of health stock. Indeed, any increase in the level of health of the current
period increases the future marginal utility of health. The eect of inter-temporal substitution
between present and future stocks becomes weak if health habits are persistent. In this case,
the representative household has to spend much more wealth between the current period and
the future period to improve the stock of future health. And even with a low rate of health
depreciation, the costs of health investments become increasingly high.
4.2 Phase diagrams
We now elaborate on how the health parameters aect the steady-state values, notably the
health investment variable and the consequences on consumption, capital stock and savings. To
this end, we study the equilibrium dynamics of this economy. Using the same variable denition
above, the dynamical system is computed as:
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_c
c
=
 (r   )M + ( 1 + 2)( MM + bmk +1)
 1M  
r + (1  )

+ c+m
_m
m
= c1m1 M2k 2+ 1

bm 1+M 2k2 +1

c1 1
 1 + 1 + wc
 1

M1 2k2 1
 1 + 2

+ ( M   r)c 1m 1+k1 

M1 2k2 1
 1 + 2

( 1 + 2)

((  )(( Mk 1))

  r + (1  )

+ c+m
_M
M
=
bmk+1
M
  M   r + (1  )

+ c+m
(31)
Here again, we turn to analysis of the changes in the equilibrium when some health parameters
are modied. Lemma 2 documents on the phase diagrams in Figures 5, 6 and 7 which are
associated to the system Eq.(31).
Lemma 2 We have:
i) For m xed, the curve _c = 0 is a horizontal line and the locus _M = 0 is an increasing and
concave function, with lim M!1 c = a0 for a0 given.
ii) For c xed, the curves _m = 0 and _M = 0 are convex and monotonically increasing with
lim m!a M =1 and lim m!a0 M =1 for a and a0 given.
iii) For M xed, the curve _c = 0 is decreasing and the locus _m = 0 is an increasing function
and it decreases monotonically from m1.
Insert Figures 5, 6, 7
We x m and get the rst diagram in Figure 5 onto the plane (c; M). As for the additive
case, the curve _c = 0 doesn't dependent on the stock of health M . The consumption depends
though only on the ow of investment and on the rate of health depreciation. The curve _M = 0
is concave and increases with both variables. Starting from the steady state E0, an increase
of M shifts upward the level of consumption, leading to the nal equilibrium point E1. The
depreciation of health reduces the stock of health, but this reduction is compensated by the shift
of consumption. The result is a net increase of health.
The second phase diagram in Figure 6 is plotted onto the plane ( m; M) by xing c. The two
curves are increasing with the variables m and M , but the stock of health grows faster than the
ow of investment. An increasing rate of health depreciation leads to a high reduction of the
stock of health which is not fully compensated by the investment. So the two curves shift down
to the steady state E1.
The third diagram in Figure 7 is obtained onto the plane (c; m) by xing M . There is a
linear relation between c and m that gives the monotonically decreasing curve. An increase of
the depreciation rate shifts upward the consumption and the ow of investment in health on the
curve _c = 0. We have the same with the curve _m = 0. The nal steady state is reached at E1
where both variables increase.
Let us discuss insights from the equilibrium dynamic considering the eects of parameters in
the dierent models and taking into account the dynamics of transition. We assume the economy
is on balanced growth path when a parameter varies, and we analyze the adjustments to the new
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equilibrium path. Let's take the example of the phase diagram where we consider a variation of
the rate of depreciation of health M . Fixing m, the phase diagrams are obtained on the plane
( _c; _M) of Figures 2 and 5 wherein there are two curves for the additive and multiplicative cases.
The rst ones ( _c = 0) are independent of the stock of health. The curves M = 0 are concave
and grow with both variables. In the case of the separable utility, an increase in the rate of
impairment of health implies a movement of the second curve ( _M = 0) to the left. This induces
a reduction of the health by the move from the stable equilibrium E0 to a new equilibrium E1
where consumption remains constant. Conversely, in the multiplicative case, starting from the
steady state E0, an increase in M shifts up the level of consumption, leading to the end point
of equilibrium E1. Impairment of health reduces the stock of health, but this decrease is oset
by the increase in consumption. The result is a net increase in the stock of health.
Fixing c gives both Figures 3 and 6 on the plane ( _m; _M) that relate the stock of health to
health investment. For the additive as well as for the multiplicative case, the curve ( _M = 0)
increases, but the health stock increases faster than investment ows. When impairment of
health increases, this implies a lower level of health stock. The curve m = 0 moves to the left.
But the ow of investment increases, which means that the nal steady state is reached when
the curve _M = 0 shifts to the right. The nal state of equilibrium point is E1 where the stock
of health is lower than the rst equilibrium point E0.
Fixing M produces Figures 4 and 7 in the plane ( _c; _m). For the additive case, starting from
the equation ( _c = 0) we see that there always exists a linear relationship between the ow of
health investments and consumption. The trajectories converge to equilibrium from the areas
of stability on the left values of E0. An increase in M generates a high level of investment
ows. In addition, a crowding eect appears and consumption reduced from E0 to E1. For
the multiplicative case, the equilibrium is reached at point E1 where both variables increase
simultaneously.
5 Convex combination of preferences
In this section, we combine both cases in a general framework. Indeed, it is likely that be-
tween purely additive and multiplicative preferences, there might a range of choice in between
depending parameter link that may drive agents' behavior. The welfare function V takes now
the form:
V () = sU(C(z))'(M(z)) + (1  s)[U(C(z)) + '(M(z))] (32)
and s is a parameter link such that 0  s  1. If s = 1 then the individual preference becomes
additive and for s = 0 it is multiplicative.
The dynamic system then is obtained by the Eqs.(7a)-(7d). The optimization equations
(5a)-(5d) provide sucient conditions for maximizing welfare because of the concavity of the
utility function, the production of health and health investment. The Hamiltonian is a concave
function of the state variables and control variables. The following result holds:
Proposition 4 The equilibrium values of health stock are located on a trajectory which is time
dependent and given by the relation:
cM(z; s) = h0(s) + 1e z(r )i 11 2 (33)
with 0(s) =  s1 21 s and 1 = (1  2) where  is an integration constant.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 4 is interesting as it shows that the balance health variables cM and m^ can be ex-
pressed as a function of time, regardless of other real variables such as consumption and capital
per capita. However, as Eqs.(7a)-(7d) of the general system establish the links between the
variables in the model, the equilibrium expression of these variables can be recovered. But this
approach is analytically complicated if not impossible. Moreover, as we have documented in the
Appendix B, studying analytically the equilibrium dynamics of the model in the case of convex
combination of preferences is unbearable.
The expression of health investment at equilibrium bm(z) is then obtained as:
bm(z) = M
b
 1
 h
0(s) + 1e
 z(r )
i 1
(1 2) (34)
Relying on Eq.(7b) and using S'[M
(z)] = (1 s)'M [M(z)] and SU [C(z)] = (1 s)UC [C(z)]
the expression of wage rate is obtained as:
w(M(z)) =
(M + r)hm[m
(z)]
'M [M(z)] m[m(z)]
  'M [M
(z)]
U2C [C
(z)]
(35)
where M(z) and m(z) are replaced by their expressions.
Figure 8 shows the evolution of the stock of health and health investment. The curves depart
from an initial value at time z = 0 given by the expressions cM(0; s) and bm(0; s) as described
below. As in the model of Ehrlich and Chuma (1990), cM and bm are decreasing and tend to a
minimum.
Insert Figure 8
Furthermore, Proposition 4 allows us to study the limits behavior of stock and investment in
health. We can distinguish two cases: i) innite horizon (z !1) and ii) nite horizon (z ! T ).
In the rst case, taking the limit of Eqs.(33) and (34), we obtain respectively: limz!1 cM(z; s) =cM(1; s) = [0(s)] 11 2 and limz!1 bm(z; s) = bm(1; s) = ( Mb ) 1 [0(s)] 1(1 2) . For z = 0, we
have cM(0; s) = [0(s) + (1  2)] 11 2 and bm(0; s) = ( Mb ) 1 [0(s) + (1  2)] 1(1 2) . Innite
horizon also implies high health deterioration meaning that health will tend to its minimum. It
follows that cMmin(1; s) = [0(s)] 11 2 and bmmin(1; s) = ( Mb ) 1 [0(s)] 1(1 2) .
The case of nite horizon is of particular interest because it provides the expression of the
time limit for the stock of health to be low, and that life ends at some T (; s). We have:
lim
z!T
cM(z; s) = cM(T; s) = h0(s) + (1  2)e T (r )i 11 2 (36)
When T is reached, health reaches its minimum given by Eq.(36). Figure 9 displays the graph
for that case. cM(T; s) decreases and reaches its minimum at horizon T (s).
Insert Figure 9
An interesting theoretical issue is what would be the value of time horizon T , if the min-
imum level of health is known. Let's recall our approach to better understand the theoretical
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importance of the nite time horizon. In the model, we looked for the optimal paths of consump-
tion, capital and health variables for innite horizon. The framework of convex combination of
preferences leads to purely temporal expression of health stock and health investment. These
variables depend on what we call the structure parameter or convexity of the model, s. The
latter allows to balance the model between the two polar cases: additive and multiplicative
welfare function. The benet of having optimal variables that are expressed in terms of time
is that one can identify the limits which in turn depend on the model parameters. Therefore,
setting s, and making assumptions about the minimum value of the stock of health, we can infer
a temporal horizon that represents longevity, i.e. life duration over which health keeps economic
activities of work, consumption and investment. Suppose the minimum stock is not zero, then T
can be obtained from Eq.(36) for cM(T; s) = cMmin(s), and be expressed in terms of other model
parameters as:
T =
1
r    ln
 
(1  2)cMmin(s)  0(s)
!
= T0 +
1
r    ln
 
1  2cMmin(s) + s1 21 s
!
(37)
with T0 =
1
r  ln . The study of function T with respect to parameters is interesting from two
points of view. First, this horizon should ideally be farthest from zero as possible. Therefore,
it is crucial to understand the role of each parameter to achieve this goal. Secondly, we have
not explicitly sought optimal longevity as in Ehrlich and Chuma (1990). However, our approach
leads to a model of optimal lifetime which generalizes Ehrlich and Chuma (1990). Indeed, as
the authors, we nd the same parameters that determine lifespan. In addition, here, lifespan
also depends on the way welfare is chosen, i.e. parameter s. If we elaborate only on the eect
of 2 parameter, we have the following representation of T :
Insert Figure 10
In Figure 10, 2 = 1   (1 s)2s cMmin(s) and 2 = 1   (1 s)(1 s) scMmin(s) and T (2; s) is given by
Eq.(37) evaluated at 2. Figure 10 also shows interesting aspects of the modeling. First of
all, observe the vertical dotted line that stresses the constraint 2 < 1. The longevity T curve
shows a convex-concave shape. Indeed, the rst portion of the curve which departs from T (s; 0)
decreases convexly to reach the inection point (T (2; s); 2) where the curve becomes concave
till the point 2. Therefore, longevity is a decreasing function of the elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution of health 2. We also see that as long as 2 < 2, lifespan is strictly positive. This
indicates that there is a maximal bound for 2 beyond which the stock of health is minimal.
Thus, the choice of 2 will impact the longevity modeling. Indeed, if 2 2]2; 1[, longevity is
zero, this means that the stock of health has no eect on real variables. As a result, there is
no longer life: cM(z; s) = cMmin(s) = 0 for all z. However, if one chooses 2 2]2; 1[, it is still
possible to give a positive value to T provided to identify the structural parameter s which gives
more weight to either the additive preference (s ! 0) or the multiplicative one (s ! 1). For
s = 1 (multiplicative), we have 2 = 2 = 1. So one can choose 2 in the range [0; 1[ and
therefore T > 0. In other words, opting for multiplicative preferences rules out the problem of
existence of T . However, if an additive preference (s = 0) is chosen, one should care about the
issue of existence of T .
Some comments related to Propositions 2, 3 and 4 are in order. In economic theory, the
eect of health quality care is often approached indirectly. Indeed, it is straightforward to
measure health inputs and the indirect eects of health on the economy (through indicators
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that are positively correlated with good health conditions, such as increased life expectancy,
low morbidity rates, etc.). Although the quality of health is not directly measurable, our model
allows to specify conditions for good health, by connecting three quantitative factors, namely
health production, health investment and health costs. We have shown that the elasticities (, 
and 2) of these three variables work together to dene how health status inuences labor. The
model enables us to link the evolution of wage rates with respect to health. The transmission belt
between the wage rate and health is labor productivity. As better health conditions enhances
human capacities, the values created in the production process are improve in turn.
Two problems arise: those of causality and indeterminacy. There is a causality problem
because when wage rates become too high, the most productive agents, that is to say, those with
higher wages, consume more and more goods that improve health. Thus, causality can pass from
greater labor productivity to better health, not from health to productivity. This is typically a
reverse causality issue. The indeterminacy arises with the model specication. Indeed, there are
values of the elasticities ( = ) for which the model may not have equilibrium and the inuence
of health on the wage rate becomes indeterminate. This also coincides with the fact that the
opportunity cost of health stock becomes time independent. Figure 11 shows the combinations
of parameters  and  that allows our models to have solutions.
Insert Figure 11
The axis OO0 makes an angle of 45 with the axis O and the combination solutions which
have the properties of additive and multiplicative case is delimited by the bold lines of the
trapezium (OO0O00O000), once the parameters  and  are set. On one hand, this is actually a
combination of points belonging to the surfaces of triangles OO0O00 (additive preferences) and
OO00O000 on the other hand (multiplicative preferences). These points are on the segment O0E0.
However, the intersection points E with the segment OO00 are excluded from the model because
they check the equality condition  = .
It is worth to notice a recurring problem in the eld of health investment. Indeed, usually
the aim is to look for the second best optimum in order to conciliate eciency and social equity
by proposing an optimal tax system and subsidies. Indeed, according to neoclassical theory,
eciency is reached when all agents behave competitively, and optimal allocations are then rst
best. Equity can be achieved through redistribution of income between healthy workers, workers
whose health stock is low, and investors. This would have allowed us to disconnect the `nal
distribution of health stock' of that resulting from the ex-post prices and elasticities structure of
production and investment. But at this stage of our model, the issue is not that of equity. Our
intuition is that we could have come up with explanations for the dierence in results between
the additive and the multiplicative preferences. We leave this for future research.
6 Opportunity costs of health
In this section, we compare the opportunity costs of health investment under the three alternative
preferences. Such comparison is useful for policy analysis. Indeed, for a decision maker, it is
interesting to know what investment alternative is the most eective in face of limited resources.
Actually, for public policy reasons, the health sector is in competition with others economic
sectors. A a result, the less costly alternative might be privileged. However, cost is only one
input of the decision, as the latter should also consider the expected benet from the investment
in order to have a full picture of the decision options. This usually leads to an empirical cost
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benet analysis. Our objective here is to shed a theoretical light on the cost aspect of that
mechanism.
In section 2, we established in Eq.(9) the expression of the opportunity cost in a very general
way. The latter provides the present value of the benets of health stock available on the
remaining life. We can derive the analogue of Eq.(9) for each type of preference. In the additive
case, we have:
g1(M(z)) =
Z 1
z

'M (M(x))

w(M) +
1
A(0)
(S'VS) e
( r)x

e (M+r)(x z)dx (38)
where the wage rate w is given by Eq.(20c). For multiplicative preference, we have:
g2(M(z)) =
Z 1
z

'M (M(x))

w(M) +
1
A(0)
(N'VN ) e
( r)x

e (M+r)(x z)dx (39)
where the wage rate w is given by Eq.(30). For the convex combination of preferences, we have:
g3(M(z)) =
Z 1
z

'M (M(x))

w(M) +
1
A(0)
(sU + (1  s)) e( r)x

e (M+r)(x z)dx (40)
where the wage rate w is given by Eq.(35). The functions or distributions g1(M(z)), g2(M(z))
and g3(M(z)) for 0  z  1 can be compared using the notion of stochastic dominance. Dene
the distributions gi(M(x)) for preferences structure i = 1; 2; 3 (additive, multiplicative and
convex combination respectively) as
gi(M(x)) = 'M (M(x))

wi(M(x)) +
1
A(0)
ie
( r)x

e (M+r)(x z) (41)
where 1 = S'VS , 2 = N'VN and 3 = sN'VN + (1  s)S'VS . We can then write
gi(M((z)) =
Z 1
z
gi(M(x))dx
implying that gi(M(z)) is the complementary cumulative distribution ofM(x). That is gi(M(z)) =
1 F (M(z)) where F (M(z)) = R z 1 gi(M(x))dx is the cumulative distribution of M(x).
Denition 1 A complementary cumulative distribution (CCD) F is said to rst-order stochas-
tically dominate (FOSD) another distribution G if and only if F (x)  G (x) for all values of x.
A CCD F is said to second-order stochastically dominate (SOSD) another distribution G if and
only if
R1
z F (x)dx 
R1
z G (x)dx for all z, with a strict inequality for at least some values of z.
Note that if F and G in the Denition 1 were cumulative distributions rather than CCDs
then the inequalities would be reversed. In relation to the expressions of opportunity costs,
gi(M(z)) FOSD gj(M(z)) for i 6= j implies that the opportunity cost under preference structure
i is greater than the opportunity cost under preference structure j for all values of M(z). The
following result holds:
Proposition 5 Let the structure of opportunity costs be as in Eqs.(38-40) and let hM(x)iwi
denote the expected value ofM(x) under wage rate distribution wi(M(x)). If C(x)  (1 1)
1
1 1
for all x, then:
(i) g2(M(z)) FOSD g1(M(z)) whenever w1(M(x)) = w2(M(x)) for all M(x) or hM(x)iw2 
hM(x)iw1,
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(ii) g2(M(z)) FOSD g3(M(z)) whenever w2(M(x)) = w3(M(x)) for all M(x) or hM(x)iw2 
hM(x)iw3,
(iii) g3(M(z)) FOSD g1(M(z)) whenever w1(M(x)) = w3(M(x)) for all M(x) or hM(x)iw3 
hM(x)iw1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1 There are two possible ways to determine whether hM(x)iwi  hM(x)iwj or estab-
lishing conditions on the model parameters for the inequality to be true. The rst is to directly
solve for the average values hM(x)iwi for all i = 1; 2; 3 and compare the resulting functions.
That is for each i hM(x)iwi =
R1
 1M(x)wi(M(x))dx. The dicultly with this approach is that
computing the respective integrals is not necessarily feasible, specially when the relationship be-
tween wi(M(x)) and M(x) is implicit as it is the case for the additive preferences (see Eq.20c).
Moreover, even when the integration is feasible, the resulting expressions are too complex for
direct comparison. The second technique would be to solve for the value of M(x) (denoted by
M(x)) for which wi(M(x)) = wj(M(x)). For example, in the case of w1(M(x)) and w2(M(x)),
M(x) can be obtained by solving the steady state simultaneous equations. Once M(x) is ob-
tained, one could then obtain the derivative (tangent) of wi(M(x)) at M
(x) for each i. The
idea would then be to compare the resulting values, such that if the derivative of wi(M(x)) at
M(x) is greater than the derivative of wj(M(x)) at M(x) then hM(x)iwi  hM(x)iwj . This
approach is equally infeasible due to complexity of the each wi(M(x)).
Proposition 5 allows to study the relative behavior of the opportunity costs for dierent
types of modeling. Are these costs minimized or exaggerated, if an additive, multiplicative or a
convex combination of both is assumed? To answer this question, we have made assumptions
about the wage rates to simplify calculations. We nd that: i) the opportunity cost is higher in
the multiplicative model than in the additive model, ii) it is higher in the multiplicative model
than in the convex combination model, iii) it is higher in the convex combination model than
in the additive model. The relationships described above are also based on the condition that
consumption has a lower limit set dened by the terms of stochastic dominance.
To understand the intuition behind these results, it is worth noticing that in this general equi-
librium setting in which labor productivity depends on health, any increase in health investment
has an opportunity cost, at least in terms of consumption. Presumably if the inter-temporal
substitution of health becomes stronger, it would contradict the gradual depreciation of the
stock of health over time. Thus, substitutability cannot grow indenitely, unless it is accom-
panied by higher investment costs, which explains the upper limit imposed on the elasticity of
inter-temporal substitution.
In terms of policy implication, two contrasting visions appear. First, it is plausible to
assume that opportunity costs (in terms of consumption) of investments in health are greater
in developing countries than in developed countries, although the constraints on the impact of
health on the wage rate appear to be identical for both. The multiplicative preferences are
therefore more appropriate for developing countries where the inertia in health behaviors is
much higher. Similarly additive preferences which consider consumption and health spending as
separable in the welfare function seem more appropriate for developed countries. The dilemma
is that in order for health to have a strong inuence on the wage rate and therefore on wage
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income, it must bear higher and higher costs of health investment. This calls for a tradeo
which is not always easy for developing countries. A solution for these countries would be
rst to implement public policies aimed at facilitating access to low-cost of health care. This
implies increased cooperation with developed countries which have advanced social and health
protection systems, while developing social security schemes. Fight against epidemics is a good
illustration.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium framework to study the role of preferences
structure. We connect the stock of health consumption, capital, wage rate, interest rate and
parameters such as time preference and elasticities of inter-temporal substitution. We have show
that there is a unique value of the stock of health, which ensures the equilibrium dynamic of the
economy, regardless of the form of the welfare function. We nd that there are three parameters
that play a crucial role not only for the existence of the equilibrium values, but also for the
eect of health on the wage rate: the elasticity of substitution of health between two periods,
the elasticity of investment in health and that of the dual cost of this investment relative to
investment ows itself.
One question is how the stock of health aects the wage rate. The answer is not straight-
forward as it might look at rst glance. Indeed, if the preferences are additive, the eect of the
stock of health on the wage rate is positive only under some parameter constraints dened by
the optimization problem. Moreover, the impact is positive only from a minimum wage rate.
Therefore it is possible that the stock of health has a negative eect on the wage rate. When
the preferences are multiplicative, the eect of health on wages is positive everywhere.
Several challenges remain to be addressed. Some of them include investigating: i) the role
for preventive health care along with having the consumer's wage and working time dependent
on health, ii) the heterogeneity and population uncertainty (e.g. young/old, insured/uninsured),
iii) infectious diseases and their modes of transmission in our dynamic setting to study as to how
health deterioration may aect the existence of solutions to the optimization problem as well to
assess the impact of health on variables such as capital accumulation, consumption, wage rates
and productivity.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is quite intuitive. Indeed, let us denote w the equilibrium wage rate. The left hand
side of the Eq.(20c) is strictly increasing in cM , while the right hand side is strictly decreasing,
and the latter is equal to zero when
cM = b
M

w
1     ( w
)
1
1   w

(r + )(1  )

and equals to
b

b
M
 2

(M+r)
h
w +

w
1 

1  r+
1i
if cM = 0, which implies that there is a
unique solution cM to Eq.(20c). 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of the rst inequality   (1 2) results in studying the variation of w with respect
to health stock M . Eq.(20c) can be rewritten in terms of output as:
f(M) = cM2 1+   b

b
M
 2

(M + r)
"
w +

w
1  

1  
r + 

 

M
b
 1
 cM 11#
Relying on the implicity function theorem, after rearranging the terms of the derivative below,
one gets:
@w(M)
@M
=   @f(M)=@M
@f(M)=@w(M)
=
WN
WD
(A-1)
where
WN =

b
M
2
(M + r)
" b b
M
 2 M
b
 1

M
 1+ 1


 

M
b
 1

M
1
 +
w(1  
r+
)
1 
 1+1
1
(M + r)
+M
 2+

+2

  1 + 

+ 2
#
and
WD = b
266641 +

1  
r+

 

M
b
 1

M
1
 +
w(1  
r+
)
1 
 1+1
1
1  
37775
It follows from WN and WD that the eect of the health stock on the wage rate is positive if
  (1  2). The proof of the second inequality  >  follows from the stability of equilibria.
We introduce this in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The dynamical system is stable i  >  and   (1  2).
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Proof. The proof of this lemma requires studying the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the
system (24a)-(24c). After deriving and rearranging terms of calculations, the Jacobian is given
by
J =
0B@ J11 J12 J13J21 J22 J23
J31 J32 J33
1CA
where J11 =J12 =J31 = 1, J13 = 0 and
J21 = 1  bc
 1+1k1 2 +m +M 21
(  )
J22 = 1  bk
 2 +m 1 +M 2(c1k1 + w)( + )
(  )
J23 = 1  bk
 2 +m +M 1 22(c1k1 + w)
(  )
J32 = 1 +
bk 1+m 1+
M
J33 =  bk
 1+m
M
2
The determinant of J is computed as:
det(J ) =   1
c(  )

b2k 1 2 +2m 1 +2M 2 2
 
c1k1m1
+ c1+1k1(+ ( 1 + 2)) + cw(+ ( 1 + 2))
 (A-2)
which is negative if  >  to ensure the positivity of the denominator. This also implies the
existence of a saddle point. The stability also depends on the sign of the trace of the matrix.
The trace is computed as
Tr(J ) = 2  bk
 1+m
M
2 +
bk 2 +m 1 +M 2(c1k1 + w)

(A-3)
which is positive. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
To prove (i), it is straightforward to check that the left hand side of Eq.(29c) is increasing
whereas the right hand side is decreasing. The inequality in ii) can be split into two parts:
  (1   2) and  < . The proof of the rst part relies on the study of Eq.(29c). Solving
this relation with respect to wage leads to:
w(M) =

M
b


M 1+2(M + r)
0@M  + M Mb    MMb  1 ( 1+2)(M+r)( 1+1)
1A
M

1 + M
 1+2 (2r+2 )( 1+2)
(r+)(1 )( 1+1)
 (A-4)
The derivative of (A-4) is given by
@w(M)
@M
=
WN
WD
(A-5)
Etudes et Documents n° 07, CERDI, 2015
28
where
WN =M
1+

1 +
M 1+2(2r + 2   )( 1 + 2)
(r + )(1  )( 1 + 1)

+
0BBBB@
M2(2r + 2   )
 
M +
M

M
b
 
( 1+2)2
(M+r)( 1+1)
!
(r + )(1  )( 1 + 1)
1CCCCA
+M
0B@M + M

M
b
 
( 1 + 2)
(M + r)( 1 + 1)
1CA1 + M 1+2(2r + 2   )( 1 + 2)
(r + )(1  )( 1 + 1)


 1 + 1

+ 2

(A-6)
and
WD = M

1 +
M 1+2(2r + 2   )( 1 + 2)
(r + )(1  )( 1 + 1)
2
(A-7)
which proves the rst inequality in ii). The proof of the second inequality  <  follows from
the stability of equilibria. We introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 4 The dynamical system is stable i  <  and   (1  2).
Proof. The proof of this lemma requires studying the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the
system (31). After deriving and rearranging terms of calculations, the Jacobian is given by
J =
0B@ J11 J12 J13J21 J22 J23
J31 J32 J33
1CA
where J11 =J31 = 1 and
J12 = 1  bk
1 m 1+( 1 + 2)
M1
J13 =  k
 (MMk   bkm)( 1 + 2)
M21
J21 =  M
2   bk1+ m +  M +M( + )1 + bk1+ m +2
M(  )( 1 + 1)
J22 =
1
( 1 + 1)k
 m 1 M 1 2

  km1+M1+2  bck1+mM2
  bk+2mMw +M   km1+M2  bk+2m1 + bck1+mM22
J23 =
bk m +M
 2 2

   ckM2 + (ckM2   k2Mw + k2Mw1)2
(  )( 1 + 1)
J32 = 1 +
bk1+m 1+
M
J33 =  bk
1+m
M
2
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The determinant of J is computed as:
det(J ) =
(  )
(1  1)1 bk
 2m 1 +M
 4 2

 
bk1++2+2mM
2
w21(   + 2)"
(1  2)(bk1+mM(kM2(m+ c) + k2Mw)  MMk(k+2M2w + bk2++mM2
+ k1+2mM
1+2
+ k1+M
1+2
(m+ c)) + k1+(MMk
M
2
(mM + cM + bk1+m)
+ bmM( kM2(m+ c) + k2Mw))2) +M1(MMk( k+2Mw + k1+2mM2)
bk1+m(k1+2M
2
(m+ c) + k2Mwk2+2Mw) + (MMk
( k+2Mw + k1+2mM2)
+ bk1+m(k1+2M
2
(m+ c) + k2Mw(  2)  k2+2Mw))2 + bk1++2mMw22))
#
(A-8)
which is negative if  <  to guarantee the positivity of the denominator. This also implies the
existence of a saddle point. The stability depends on the sign of the trace of the matrix. It is
computed as:
Tr(J ) =
1
(1  1)

2  bk
1+m
M
2 +
bck1+ m 1 +
M
+ bk +2m 1 +M
 2
w
+

  2 + bk
1+m
M
2

  bk +2m 1 +M 2w

1   bck
1+ m 1 +2
M

(A-9)
which is positive. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof follows from the general system. Indeed, Eq.(7a) in the system becomes a dierential
equation of the form:
s(r   ) + (1  s)(r   )M(z)
1 2
1  2 + (1  s)M(z)
 2 _M(z) = 0 (A-10)
This dierential equation is linear in _M(z) and it's straightforward to check that the analytical
solution is given by the expression of cM(z; s) (Eq. 33) in the Proposition. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
The proof follows by pairwise comparison of gi(M(z))'s. Generally,
gi(M(z)) gj(M(z)) =
Z 1
z
'M (M(x))

wi(M(x))  wj(M(x)) + 1
A(0)
(i   j) e( r)x

e (M+r)(x z)dx
(A-11)
implying that the crucial components when performing pairwise comparisons are wij(M(x)) =
wi(M(x)) wj(M(x)) and ij(z) = i  j . Since 'M (M(x))  0 for all M(x), it follows that
gi(M(z))   gj(M(z))  0 (that is gi(M(z)) FOSD gi(M(z)) if either; (a) wij(M(x)) > 0 and
ij(x)  0 for all x hence all M(x), (b) or wij(M(x)) = 0 and ij(x)  0 for all x hence all
M(x), (c) or ij(x)  0 for all x and there exists an x hence M(x) such that wij(M(x)) > 0
for all M(x) M(x).
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If hM(x)iwi is the expected value ofM(x) under wage rate distribution wi(M(x)), the condi-
tions that wij(M(x)) > 0 for all M(x) and that there exists an M(x
) such that wij(M(x)) > 0
for all M(x) M(x), are equivalent to saying that hM(x)iwi  hM(x)iwj . The rst condition
for gi(M(z)) to FOSD gj(M(z)) is then that hM(x)iwi  hM(x)iwj . What remains is to show
condition under which ij(x)  0 for each pair of i and j.
(i) For the case of additively separable and multiplicative preferences, we have that
21(x) = N'VN   S'VS
From the expression of V;N and S, we have that VN = VS = S' = 1 and N' = U(C(x)). Such
that N'VN = U(C(x)) and S'VS = 1. 21(x) then becomes
21(x) = U(C(x))  1 = 1
1  2C(x)
1 2   1
Implying that 21(x)  0 if C(x)  (1  1)
1
1 1 for all x.
(ii) Similarly, for the multiplicative and convex combination preferences,
23(x) = N'VN   (sN'VN +(1  s)S'VS) = (1  s)U(C(x))  (1  s) = (1  s)(U(C(x)) 1)
Since 0 < s < 1, it follows that 23(x)  0 if U(C(x))  1  0 for all x ) C(x)  (1  1)
1
1 1
for all x.
(iii) Finally, for the convex combination and additive preferences,
31(x) = sN'VN + (1  s)S'VS   S'VS = s(U(C(x))  1)
Hence 31(x)  0 if C(x)  (1  1)
1
1 1 for all x. 
B Note on the convex combination of preferences
For the convex combination of preferences, the steady state of the model is governed by the
system:
_^
C(z)
C^(z)
=
( 1 + s)(r   )M(z) + s(r   )M(z)2( 1 + 2)  ( 1 + s)( 1 + 2)
  MM(z) + bm(z)
1(( 1 + s)M(z) + sM(z)2( 1 + 2))
_^m(z)
m^(z)
= C(z)
1m(z)
1 
M(z)
2

bm(z)
 1+
M(z)
 2

  s  ( 1 + s)C(z)
1 1
 1 + 1
+ wC(z)
 1

  s  ( 1 + s)M(z)
1 2
 1 + 2

+ ( M   r)C(z) 1m(z) 1+

  s
  ( 1 + s)M(z)
1 2
 1 + 2

( 1 + 2)

((  )(( 1 + s)M(z) + sM(z)2( 1 + 2)

_^
M(z) =  M + bm(z)

m(z)
_^
kz = B(M(z))k^(z)
   C^(z)  m^(z)  k^(z)
(A-12)
with k^(0) and M^(0) given, plus the transversality conditions. The steady-state values C^, m^,
M^ , and k^ can be obtained by equalizing
_^
C, _^m,
_^
M ,
_^
k to zero. The dynamics of the economy is
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driven at the equilibrium by the following system:
_c
c
=
( 1 + s)(r   )Mk 1 + s(r   )M2k 2( 1 + 2)  ( 1 + s)( 1 + 2)
  MMk 1 + bmk 
1(( 1 + s)Mk 1 + sM2k 2( 1 + 2))
  r + (1  )

+ c+m
_m
m
= C1m1 M
2
k 2+ 1

bm 1+M
 2
k2 +1

  s  ( 1 + s)C
1 1
 1 + 1
+ wC 1

  s  ( 1 + s)M
1 2
k2 1
 1 + 2

+ ( M   r)C 1m 1+k1 

  s
  ( 1 + s)M
1 2
k2 1
 1 + 2

( 1 + 2)

((  )(( 1 + s)Mk 1 + sM2k 2( 1 + 2)

  r + (1  )

+ c+m
_M
M
=  M + bm
k+1
M
  r + (1  )

+ c+m
(A-13)
The Jacobian of this system is given by
J =
0B@ J11 J12 J13J21 J22 J23
J31 J32 J33
1CA
where J11 =J13 =J21 =J31 = 1 and
J12 = 1  bk
1 m 1+( 1 + s)( 1 + 2)
1

M( 1+s)
k + k
 2M
2
s( 1 + s)

J13 =  k
 (MMk   bkm)( 1 + 2)
M21
J22 = (k
 m 1 M
 2
(bk1++2mM
2
( 1 + s)C( 1 + 2)
+ bk1++2mM
2
sC1( 1 + 1)( 1 + 2) + (km1+M2
+ bk+2mw)( 1 + 1)(k2M( 1 + s)  kM2s+ kM2s2)))=(( 1 + 1)(k2M( 1 + s)
  kM2s+ kM2s2))
J23 = (bk
 +2m +M
 1 2
(w( 1 + 1)2(k2M( 1 + s)  kM2s+ kM2s2)2
+ kM
2
( 1 + s)C( 1 + 2)(k2M( 1 + s)  kM2s2 + kM2s22)
+ kM
2
sC1( 1 + 1)( 1 + 2)(k2M( 1 + s)
  kM2s2 + kM2s22)))=((  )( 1 + 1)(k2M( 1 + s)  kM
2
s+ kM
2
s2)
2)
J32 = 1 +
bk1+m 1+
M
J33 =  bk
1+m
M
2
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The determinant of J is computed as:
det(J ) =
1
M2
k 2((k2m 1 (MMk
   bkm)M1 2( 1 + s)( 1 + 2)(k2M( 1 + s)  kM2s2
+ kM2s22)(bk
1++2mM2( 1 + s)C(z)( 1 + 2) + bk1++2mM2sC(z)1( 1
+ 1)( 1 + 2) + (km1+M2+ bk+2mw)( 1 + 1)(k2M( 1 + s)  kM2s
+ kM2s2)))=(( 1 + 1)1(k2M( 1 + s)  kM2s+ kM2s2)3)
+ (bk++2m +M1 2

1  bk
 m 1+( 1 + s)( 1 + 2)
1(
M( 1+s)
k
+ k 2M2s( 1 + 2)

(w( 1 + 1)
2((k
2M( 1 + s)  kM2s+ kM2s2)2 + kM2( 1 + s)C(z)( 1 + 2)(k2M( 1 + s)
  kM2s2 + kM2s22) + kM2sC(z)1( 1 + 1)( 1 + 2)(k2M( 1 + s)  kM2s2
+ kM2s22)))=((  )( 1 + 1)(k2M( 1 + s)  kM2s+ kM2s2)2)  bk1+3m 
1  bk
 m 1+( 1 + s)( 1 + 2)
1(
M( 1+s)
k
+ k 2M2s( 1 + 2)
+ (k m 1 M2(bk1++2mM2( 1 + s)C(z)
( 1 + 2) + bk1++2mM2sC(z)1( 1 + 1)( 1 + 2) + (km1+M2+ bk+2mw)
( 1 + 1)(k2M( 1 + s)  kM2s+ kM2s2)))=(( 1 + 1)(k2M( 1 + s)  kM2s+ kM2s2)))
  (k+2M(1 + bk
1+m 1+))
M
)(
(MMk
   bkm)( 1 + s)( 1 + 2)(k2M( 1 + s)  kM2s2 + kM2s22)
1
+ 1=((  )( 1 + 1))bkm +M 2(w( 1 + 1)2(k2M( 1 + s)
  kM2s+ kM2s2)2 + kM2( 1 + s)C(z)( 1 + 2)(k2M( 1 + s)  kM2s2 + kM2s22)
+ kM2sC(z)1( 1 + 1)( 1 + 2)(k2M( 1 + s)  kM2s2 + kM2s22))))=(k2M( 1 + s)
  kM2s+ kM2s2)2)
and the trace is
Tr(J ) = 1  bk
1+m
M
2 + (k
 m 1 M
 2
(bk1++2mM
2
( 1 + s)C( 1 + 2)
+ bk1++2mM
2
sC1( 1 + 1)( 1 + 2) + (km1+M2
+ bk+2mw)( 1 + 1)(k2M( 1 + s)  kM2s+ kM2s2)))=(( 1 + 1)(k2M( 1 + s)
  kM2s+ kM2s2))
(A-14)
One can see that studying analytically the stability properties this case (convex combination
of preferences) is simply unbearable given the expression of the determinant.
C Examples of alternative preferences
In order to illustrate various aspects of the general results, we provide two examples of alter-
natives utility functions: the logarithm and the quadratic. The former is well-known to be a
special case of the CRRA utility function.
C.1 The logarithm utility
We use a simple logarithm form for the utility functions of consumption and health. The other
functions remain the same: U(C) = ln(C), '(M) = ln(M),  (m) = bm and h(m) = m. We
assume the preferences are additive. The dynamic system of the economy becomes:
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_^
C(z)
C^(z)
= r(z)   (B-1)
_^m(z)
m^(z)
=
 b(w + C(z))m(z) 
(  )M(z) +
M + r(z)
   (B-2)
_^
M(z) =  M + bm

M(z)
(B-3)
_^
k(z) = B(M(z))k^(z)   C^(z)  m^(z)  k^(z) (B-4)
As we can see, there is a unique root, say f(M) for the system (B-1)-(B-4). To obtain f(M),
owe set (B-2)-(B-4) to zero for k = (1 )(r+)w. Then, replacing m by its expression from (B-3)
leads to:
f(M) =M

  
M

M
b
 

(M + r)
"
2(r + M )  
(1  )(r + ) w  

M
b
 1

#
M
1
 (B-5)
The unique follows from that when we set f(M) = 0, then the rst component increases with
M and the second decreases. We now show how the wage rate depends on health. For that, we
express w as function of M by solving f(M) = 0:
w(M) =
(r + )(1  )
M(2r + 2   )

M
b
 1


M
b

(M + r)M

 + MM
1


(B-6)
The wage rate is an increasing function of the stock of health. Its evolution depends on the
relative values of the degrees of homogeneity of the health production and the cost of investment
function, (then on  and ). This is shown in a simulation exercise as plotted in Figure 12.
The left hand side gure display the relation for parameters values f; ; M ; r; b; ; ; g =
f0:2; 5; 0:01; 0:02; 1; 0:4; 0:05; 2g and the right hand side is for f4; 0:2; 0:01; 0:02; 1; 0:4; 0:05; 2g.
Albeit in both cases, the wage rate is an increasing function of the stock of health, the pattern
of increase diers.
Insert Figure 12
Indeed, when the growth rate of investment in health is lower than the one of its cost,
meaning when  > , the stock of health increases faster than the wage rate, up to a certain
level, say M0, which an inexion point after which, the relative evolution of the two variables
changes (w growing faster than M). To obtain this inexion point, we observe that w(M) is of
the form aM

 + bM
1
 . Setting to zero the second derivative of that expression yields
M0 =
"
   1
(  )(M + r)

M
b
 #  1
(B-7)
In the case where  < , there is no inexion in the curve which becomes concave. To
complete the example, let us briey study the equilibrium dynamics. In that case, the Jacobian
matrix turns to be
J =
0B@ 1 1 01  bk m +M 1  bk1+ m 1 +( ck+w)( +)M bk1+ m +( ck+w)M2
1 1 + bk
1 m 1+
M   bk
1 m
M2
1CA
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The determinant of J is computed as:
det(J ) =  b
2k1+ 2m 1 +2(m+ (c+ k + w))
M3(  )
Tr(J ) = 2  bk
1 m
M2
+
bk m 1 +(c+ kw)
M
One can easily check that det(J ) < 0 if  > . This leads to the conclusion that the system
admits a saddle point if  > . One of the conclusion that we can draw from the specic loga-
rithm utility is that, although this specication is free of the elasticity of substitution parameter
used in CRRA utility framework, the core ndings hold.
C.2 The quadratic utility
Unlike the preceding example in which the logarithm specication is a particular case of the
CRRA, the quadratic function departs suciently from it. Here, we will illustrate the three
cases of preferences: additive, multiplicative and the convex combination. We assume functions
of the forms:
U(C(z)) = C(z)  1(C(z))2
'(M(z)) = M(z)  2(M(z))2
with 1 6= 0 and 2 6= 0. As before, the health functions  and h maintain the same functional
form:  (m(z)) = bm and h(m(z)) = m, and we also assume the same production function.
C.2.1 Separable additive case
In this setting, the equilibrium values are given by c = 121 ,
M = 122 , m
 = ( Mb )
1
 1
(21)
1

,
k = 2(r+ )1

1 + 1(22
b
M
)
  1


and w(M) = (r+)(1 )2(r+ )1

1 + 1(21
b
M
)
  1
M
1


. We see
that the equilibrium value of wage rate w is determined by the stock health under the conditions
of Proposition 2.
Insert Figure 13
Figure 13 shows the relationship between the wage rate the stock of health. The vertical line rep-
resents the stock of health equilibrium M and w the wage rate at equilibrium; w = (r+)(1 )2(r+ )1
denotes the intercept or the minimum wage. The wage rate in this example is an increasing
function of the stock of health.
C.2.2 Multiplicative case
The equilibrium value of the stock of heath is obtained as:
M(z) =
1 
p
1  42e (r )z
22
(B-8)
Consumption at equilibrium is given by:
c =
1
21
+
a0
a1
+ a2w +
s
1
421
+

a0
a1
+ a2w
2
(B-9)
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where a0 = (r + M )1
 
M
b


 
M


 
M   2 M2

, a1 = b
M
b
M
 
1   22 M

and a2 =
  M + 2 M2. The balance wage rate w(M) can be retrieved from Eq.(B-9). However, its
expression is rather complex. From Eq.(B-8), one observes that M(z) depends on time z and
can be represented as in Figure 14.
Insert Figure 14
The graph shows an initial time z0 =
ln(42)
r  under which there is no balance of stock
health. Moreover, the balance path of the initial stock of health ( 122 ) in the multiplicative
model corresponds to the balance path of the stock of health in the additive model, the latter
being represented by the horizontal line. In other words, there exists a maximum level ( 122 )
the stock of health can not exceed. The stock of health in the multiplicative model decreases
over time to a zero minimum value. One conclusion we can draw from this example is that
the multiplicative model is more general as it provides information on the steady state of the
additive model.
C.2.3 Convex combination
The equilibrium value of the stock of heath is given by:
M(z) =
1
22
 
p
(1  s)(r   ) + 4s(r   )2(s)e (r )z
22
p
(1  s)(r   ) (B-10)
where (s) /  4e(1 s)(r )2 . The equilibrium value is closely linked to parameter s and it can
be shown that M(z) increases with s. The longevity T is computed as:
T = T0   1
r    ln

s+Mmin(1  s)  2M2min(1  s)

(B-11)
where T0 =
1
r  ln

(s)
4(r )

.
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w, f1, f2
M0
f2(M)
@w
@M > 0
w0
@w
@M < 0
f1(M)
Figure 1: Domains of wage rate
E0
C
b2
b1
a0 a1
_M = 0
M
_C = 0
E1
Figure 2: Phase diagram for additive separable preferences, plane (C, M)
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m
M
C1 C2
E0
E1
 a  a0m2
Figure 3: Phase diagram for additive separable preferences, plane ( M , m)
C0
E1
E0
m0 d0
m
C
d0
d1
Figure 4: Phase diagram for additive separable preferences, plane (C, m)
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M
C
C1
E0
E1
M1M00
C0
Figure 5: Phase diagram for multiplicative non-separable preferences, plane (C, M)
m
M
C1 C2
E0
E1
 a  a0m2
Figure 6: Phase diagram for multiplicative non-separable preferences, plane ( M , m)
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m
C
C2
C1
C0
m1
E0
E1
Figure 7: Phase diagram for multiplicative non-separable preferences, plane (C, m)
m(s; z)
M(s; z)
z
M(s; 0)
m;M
m(s; 0)
mmin(s)
Mmin(s)
Figure 8: Evolution of stock of health and health investment
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M(z)
z
Mmin(s)
M(s; 0)
T (s)
Figure 9: Evolution of stock of health in nite horizon
T (s; 2)
1
2
T (s; 2)
T (s; 0)
2 2
Figure 10: Evolution of longevity
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(1  2)

s = 1
E
s = 0
 > 
 < 
O00
 = 
O000
E 0  < 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O
O0
Figure 11: Combination of elasticities
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Wage rate
Figure 12: The logarithmic utility: relation between wage rate and health stock for parameter
values
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M
w
w
w
M
Figure 13: The quadratic utility: evolution of equilibrium stock of health for additive preferences
1
22
M
zz0
Figure 14: The quadratic utility: evolution of equilibrium stock of health
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